Category: European Union
16. December 2020
The Administrative Court of Stockholm announced on November 23rd, 2020, that it had rejected Google LLC’s appeal against the decision of the Swedish Data Protection Authority (Datainspektionen) determining Google’s violations of the GDPR. Google as a search engine operator had not fulfilled its obligations regarding the right to be forgotten (RTBF). However, the court reduced the fine from a total of SEK 75 million (approx. € 7,344,000) to SEK 52 million (approx. € 5,091,000).
Background to the case was the Swedish DPA’s audit in 2017 concerning Google’s handling of requests on delisting, which means removal of certain results from a search engine. The DPA concluded the inspection by ordering Google to delist certain individuals’ names due to inaccuracy, irrelevance and superfluous information. In 2018 the DPA initiated a follow-up audit because of indications that Google had not fully complied with the previously issued order. It resulted in issuing an administrative fine of SEK 75 million in March 2020.
The DPA raised attention to the fact that the GDPR increases the obligations of data controllers and data processors as well as strengthens the rights of individuals, which include the right to have their search result delisted. Though, Google has not been fully complying with its obligations, as it has not properly removed two of the search result listings that the DPA had ordered to delete. In one case Google has done a too narrow interpretation of what web addresses to remove, in the other case Google has failed to remove it without undue delay.
Moreover, the DPA criticized Google’s procedure of managing delisting requests and found it to be undermining data subjects’ rights. Following the removal of a search result listing, Google notifies the website to which the link is directed. The delisting request form, directed to the data subject raising the request, states that information on the removed web addresses can be provided to the webmaster. This information has to be seen as misleading since the data subject is made to understand that its consent to the notification is required in order to process the request. Therefore, such practice might result in individuals refraining from exercising their right to request delisting, which violates Art. 5 (1) lit. a) GDPR. What’s more, in the opinion of the DPA the delisting notifications to the webmasters are not covered by legal obligations according to Art. 6 (1) lit. c), 17 (2) GDPR, nor legitimate interests pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f) GDPR. Also, Google’s routine of regularly sending information to webmasters constitutes processing of personal data being incompatible with the purpose for which the data was originally collected. This practice infringes Art. 5 (1) lit. b), 6 (4) GDPR.
Google appealed the decision of the DPA. Though, the Swedish Administrative Court of Stockholm reaffirmed the DPA’s opinion and confirmed Google’s violations of the GDPR.
The court stated that the process concerning delisting requests must facilitate for the individual to exercise its rights. That means, any process that restricts the individuals’ rights may violate Art. 15 through 22 GDPR. The court also specified why the personal data had been processed beyond their original purpose. Since the notifications are only sent after Google has removed a search result, the purpose of the processing has already expired when the notification is sent. Thus, the notification cannot be considered effective in achieving the purpose specified by Google.
Google shall now delist specific search results and cease to inform webmasters of requests. Also, Google must adapt its data subject rights procedure within eight weeks after the court’s judgment has gained legal force.
8. December 2020
In November, the Austrian broadcasting network “Österreichischer Rundfunk” sparked a controversial discussion by publishing leaked drafts of the Council of the European Union (“EU Council”) on encryption (please see our blog post). After these drafts had been criticized by several politicians, journalists and NGOs, the EU Council published “Recommendations for a way forward on the topic of encryption” on December 1st, in which it considers it important to carefully balance between protecting fundamental rights with ensuring law enforcement investigative powers.
The EU Council sees a dilemma between the need for strong encryption in order to protect privacy on one hand, and the misuse of encryption by criminal subjects such as terrorists and organized crime on the other hand. They further note:
“We acknowledge this dilemma and are determined to find ways that will not compromise
either one, upholding the principle of security through encryption and security despite
encryption.”
The paper lists several intentions that are supposed to help find solutions to this dilemma.
First, it directly addresses EU institutions, agencies, and member states, asking them to coordinate their efforts in developing technical, legal and operational solutions. Part of this cooperation is supposed to be the joint implementation of standardized high-quality training programs for law enforcement officers that are tailored to the skilled criminal environment. International cooperation, particularly with the initiators of the “International Statement: End-to-End Encryption and Public Safety“, is proclaimed as a further intention.
Next the technology industry, civil society and academic world are acknowledged as important partners with whom EU institutions shall establish a permanent dialogue. The recommendations address internet service providers and social media platforms directly, noting that only with their involvement can the full potential of technical expertise be realized. Europol’s EU Innovation Hub and national research and development teams are named key EU institutions for maintaining this dialogue.
The EU Council concludes that the continuous development of encryption requires regular evaluation and review of technical, operational, and legal solutions.
These recommendations can be seen as a direct response to the discussion that arose in November. The EU Council is attempting to appease critics by emphasizing the value of encryption, while still reiterating the importance of law enforcement efficiency. It remains to be seen how willing the private sector will cooperate with the EU institutions and what measures exactly the EU Council intends to implement. This list of intentions lacks clear guidelines, recommendations or even a clearly formulated goal. Instead, the parties are asked to work together to find solutions that offer the highest level of security while maximizing law enforcement efficiency. In summary, these “recommendations” are more of a statement of intent than implementable recommendations on encryption.
27. November 2020
In the course of November 2020, the Council of the European Union issued several draft versions of a joint declaration with the working title “Security through encryption and security despite encryption”. The drafts were initially intended only for internal purposes, but leaked and first published by the Austrian brodcasting network “Österreichischer Rundfunk” (“ORF”) in an article by journalist Erich Möchel. Since then, the matter has sparked widespread public interest and media attention.
The controversy around the declaration arose when the ORF commentator Möchel presented further information from unknown sources that “compentent authorities” shall be given “exceptional access” to the end-to-end encryption of communications. This would mean that communications service providers like WhatsApp, Signal etc. would be obliged to allow a backdoor and create a general key to encrypted communications which they would deposit with public authorities. From comparing the version of the declaration from 6 November 2020 with the previous version from 21 October 2020, he highlighted that in the previous version it states that additional practical powers shall be given to “law enforcement and judicial authorities”, whereas in the more recent version, the powers shall be given to “competent authorities in the area of security and criminal justice”. He adds that the new broader wording would include European intelligence agencies as well and allow them to undermine end-to-end encryption. Furthermore, he also indicated that plans to restrict end-to-end encyption in Western countries are not new, but originally proposed by the “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance of the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.
As a result of the ORF article, the supposed plans to restrict or ban end-to-end encryption have been widely criticised by Politicians, Journalists, and NGOs stating that any backdoors to end-to-end encryption would render any secure encryption impossible.
However, while it can be verified that the “Five Eyes” propose the creation of general keys to access end-to-end encrypted communications, similar plans for the EU cannot be clearly deduced from the EU Council’s declaration at hand. The declaration itself recognises end-to-end encryption as highly beneficial to protect governments, critical infrastructures, civil society, citizens and industry by ensuring privacy, confidentiality and data integrity of communications and personal data. Moreover, it mentions that EU data protection authorities have identified it as an important tool in light of the Schrems II decision of the CJEU. At the same time, the Council’s declaration illustrates that end-to-end encryption poses large challenges for criminal investigations when gathering evidencein cases of cyber crime, making it at times “practically impossible”. Lastly, the Council calls for an open, unbiased and active discussion with the tech industry, research and academia in order to achieve a better balance between “security through encryption and security despite encryption”.
Möchel’s sources for EU plans to ban end-to-end encryption through general keys remain unknown and unverifiable. Despite general concerns for overarching surveillance powers of governments, the public can only approach the controversy around the EU Council’s declaration with due objectivity and remain observant on whether or how the EU will regulate end-to-end encryption and find the right balance between the privacy rights of European citizens and the public security and criminal justice interests of governments.
The President of the Personal Data Protection Office in Poland (UODO) imposed an admonition on a company dealing with waste management liable for a data breach and ordered to notify the concerned data subjects. The admonition is based on a violation of personal data pertaining to data subjects under medical quarantine. The city name, street name, building/flat number and the fact of remaining under quarantine of the affected data subjects have been provided by the company to unauthorized recipients. The various recipients were required to verify whether, in a given period, waste was to be collected from places determined in the above-mentioned list.
The incident already happened in April 2020. Back then, a list of data subjects was made public, containing information on who had been quarantined by the administrative decision of the District Sanitary-Epidemiological Station (PPIS) in Gniezno as well as information on quarantined data subjects in connection with crossing the country border and on data subjects undergoing home isolation due to a confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. After becoming aware of the revelation, the Director of PPIS notified the relevant authorities – the District Prosecutor’s Office and the President of UODO – about the incident.
PPIS informed them that it had carried out explanatory activities showing that the source of disclosure of these data was not PPIS. These data were provided to the District Police Headquarters, the Head of the Polish Post Office, Social Welfare Centres and the Headquarters of the State Fire Service. Considering the fact that these data had been processed by various parties involved, it was necessary to establish in which of them the breach may have occurred.
UODO took steps to clarify the situation. In the course of the proceedings, it requested information from a company dealing with waste management being one of the recipients of the personal data. The company, acting as the data controller, had to explain whether, when establishing the procedures related to the processing of personal data, it had carried out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data according to Art. 35 GDPR. The assessment persists in an analysis of the distribution method in electronic and paper form in terms of risks related to the loss of confidentiality. Furthermore, the data controller had to inform UODO about the result of this analysis.
The data controller stated that it had conducted an analysis considering the circumstances related to non-compliance with the procedures in force by data processors and circumstances related to theft or removal of data. Moreover, the data controller expressed the view that the list, received from the District Police Headquarters, only included administrative (police) addresses and did not contain names, surnames and other data allowing the identification of a natural person. Thus, the GDPR would not apply, because the data has to be seen as anonymized. However, from the list also emerged the fact that residents of these buildings/flats were placed in quarantine, which made it possible to identify them. It came out that the confidentiality of the processed data had been violated in the course of the performance of employee duties of the data processor, who had left the printed list on the desk without proper supervision. During this time, another employee had recorded the list in the form of a photo and had shared it with another person.
Following the review of the entirety of the collected material in this case, UODO considered that the information regarding the city name, street name, building/flat number and placing a data subject in medical quarantine, constitute personal data within the meaning of Art. 4 (1) GDPR, while the last comprises a special category of personal data concerning health according to Art. 9 (1) GDPR. Based on the above, it is possible to identify the data subjects, and therefore the data controller is bound to the obligations arising from the GDPR.
In the opinion of UODO, the protective measures indicated in the risk analysis are general formulations, which do not refer to specific activities undertaken by authorized employees. The measures are insufficient and inadequate to the risks of processing special categories of data. In addition, the data controller should have considered factors, such as recklessness and carelessness of employees and a lack of due diligence.
According to Art. 33 (1) GDPR, the data controller shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of the data breach, notify it to the competent supervisory authority. Moreover, in a situation of high risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects, resulting from the data breach (which undoubtedly arose from the disclosure), the data controller is obliged to inform the data subject without undue delay in accordance with Art. 34 (1) GDPR. Despite this, the company did not report the infringement, neither to the President of UODO nor to the concerned data subjects.
The European Commission (“EC”) aims for an ecosystem of cheap, versatile, and secure EU-internal data transfers, so data transfers into non-EU-regions are less needed. For this goal, the EC proposed the “Data Governance Act” on November 25th, as a part of its “2020 European strategy for data“. These strategies are intended in order to open up new ways of sharing data that is collected by companies and the public sector, or freely shared by individuals, while increasing public trust in data sharing by implementing several measures, such as establishing “data sharing intermediaries”. Combined with the Gaia-X project and several measures to follow, the Data Governance Act sets the basis to create a domestic data market that offers more efficiency of data transfers to the businesses, while also ensuring that GDPR standards are preserved. Key industries in the focus of this agenda are the agricultural, environmental, energy, finance, healthcare and mobility sectors as well as public administration.
During her speech presenting the Data Governance Act, Margarethe Vestager, Executive Vice President of the European Commission for A Europe Fit for the Digital Age, said that there are huge amounts of data produced every day, but not put to any productive use. As examples she names road traffic data from GPS, healthcare data that enables better and faster diagnosis, or data tracking heat usage from house sensors. The amount of data produced is only going to increase exponentially in the years to come. Vestager sees a lot of potential in this unused data and states the industry has an interest in using this data, however it lacks the tools to harness it.
EU based neutral data sharing intermediaries, who serve as safe data sharing organizers, are a key factor in this project. Their role is supposed to boost the willingness of sharing personal data whilst preserving the initial owner’s control. Therefore, intermediaries are not allowed to use the data for themselves, but function as neutral third-parties, transferring data between the data holder and the data user. Furthermore, intermediaries are to organize and combine different data in a neutral way, so no company secrets can be abused and the data is only used for the agreed purpose. Before they start operating, intermediates are required to notify the competent authority of their intention to provide data-sharing services.
New laws are going to ensure that sensitive and confidential data – such as intellectual property rights – can be shared and reused, while a legitimate level of protection is maintained. The same applies to data shared by individuals voluntarily. Individuals will be able to share personal data voluntarily in so-called “personal data spaces”. Once businesses will get access to these, they benefit from large amounts of data for low costs, no effort and on short notice. Vestager introduces the example of an individual suffering from a rare illness, who could provide data of his medical tests into such a personal data space, so businesses can use this data to work on treatments. Further examples are improvements in the management of climate change and the development of more precise farming tools.
To ensure the trust of potential participants, each EU-member-state is supposed to implement new competent authorities that are tasked with implementing and enforcing the Data Governance Act. A new EU-institution, the “European Data Innovation Board”, will be implemented and tasked with informing the EC about new data innovations and working out guidelines on how to implement these innovations into practice.
A more fluent exchange between different kinds of technical expertise is the hoped-for outcome of these changes, as a means to diminish the influence of big tech companies from the U.S. and China.
The Data Governance Act now needs to go through the regular legislative process. A timetable for when it is supposed to come into effect has not yet been set.
24. November 2020
Microsoft (“MS”) is among the first companies to react to the European Data Protection Board’s data transfer recommendations (please see our article), as the tech giant announced in a blog post on November 19th. MS calls these additional safeguards “Defending Your Data” and will immediately start implementing them in contracts with public sector and enterprise customers.
In light of the Schrems II ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) on June 16th, the EDPB issued recommendations on how to transfer data into non-EEA countries in accordance with the GDPR on November 17th (please see our article). The recommendations lay out a six-step plan on how to assess whether a data transfer is up to GDPR standards or not. These steps include mapping all data transfer, assessing a third countries legislation, assessing the tool used for transferring data and adding supplementary measures to that tool. Among the latter is a list of technical, organizational, and contractual measures to be implemented to ensure the effectiveness of the tool.
Julie Brill, Corporate Vice President for Global Privacy and Regulatory Affairs and Chief Privacy Officer at Microsoft, issued the statement in which she declares MS to be the first company responding to the EDPB’s guidance. These safeguards include an obligation for MS to challenge all government requests for public sector or enterprise customer data, where it has a lawful basis for doing so; to try and redirect data requests; and to notify the customer promptly if legally allowed, about any data request by an authority, concerning that customer. This was one of the main ETDB recommendations and also included in a draft for new Standard Contractual Clauses published by the European Commission on November 12th. MS announces to monetary compensate customers, whose personal data has to be disclosed in response to government requests. These changes are additions to the SCC’s MS is using ever since Schrems II. Which include (as MS states) data encrypted to a high standard during transition and storage, transparency regarding government access requests to data (“U.S. National Security Orders Report” dating back to 2011; “Law Enforcement Requests Report“) .
Recently European authorities have been criticizing MS and especially its Microsoft 365 (“MS 365”) (formerly Office 365) tools for not being GDPR compliant. In July 2019 the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands issued a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), warning authorities not to use Office 365 ProPlus, Windows 10 Enterprise, as well as Office Online and Mobile, since they do not comply with GDPR standards. The European Data Protection Supervisor issued a warning in July 2020 stating that the use of MS 365 by EU authorities and contracts between EU institutions and MS do not comply with the GDPR. Also, the German Data Security Congress (“GDSC”) issued a statement in October, in which it declared MS 365 as not being compliant with the GDPR. The GDSC is a board made up of the regional data security authorities of all 16 german states and the national data security authority. This declaration was reached by a narrow vote of 9 to 8. Some of the 8 regional authorities later even issued a press release explaining why they voted against the declaration. They criticized a missing involvement and hearing of MS during the process, the GDSC’s use of MS’ Online Service Terms and Data Processing Addendum dating back to January 2020 and the declaration for being too undifferentiated.
Some of the German data protection authorities opposing the GDSC’s statement were quick in welcoming the new developments in a joint press release. Although, they stress that the main issues in data transfer from the EU to the U.S. still were not solved. Especially the CJEU main reserves regarding the mass monitoring of data streams by U.S. intelligence agencies (such as the NSA) are hard to prevent and make up for. Still, they announced the GDSC would resume its talks with MS before the end of 2020.
This quick reaction to the EDPB recommendations should bring some ease into the discussion surrounding MS’ GDPR compliance. It will most likely help MS case, especially with the German authorities, and might even lead to a prompt resolution in a conflict regarding tools that are omnipresent at workplaces all over the globe.
20. November 2020
During its 41st plenary session, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) adopted by a two-thirds majority of its members its first dispute resolution decision under Art. 65 GDPR regarding Twitter International Company. The binding decision aims to resolve a dispute arisen from a draft decision by the Irish supervisory authority, being the lead supervisory authority in that case, and subsequent relevant and reasoned objections raised by several authorities concerned.
The Irish supervisory authority prepared a draft decision following an own-initiative investigation into Twitter International Company, after the company had notified the Irish supervisory authority of a personal data breach on January 8th, 2019. According to Art. 60 (3) GDPR, the Irish supervisory authority submitted its draft decision to the other authorities concerned in May 2020, which had the opportunity to express their objections within a period of four weeks afterwards. They referred to, inter alia, violations of the GDPR identified by the lead supervisory authority, the role of Twitter International Company as the sole data controller, and the quantification of the proposed fine.
Due to the fact that the lead supervisory authority rejected the objections and/or considered them not to be “relevant and reasoned”, it submitted the matter to the EDPB pursuant to Art. 60 (4) GDPR, thus initiating the dispute resolution procedure.
Thereupon, the completeness of the file was evaluated, that led to the institution of legal proceedings stated in Art. 65 GDPR on September 8th, 2020. In accordance with Art. 65 (3) GDPR and in conjunction with Art. 11.4 of the EDPB Rules of Procedure, the default time period of one month was extended by a further month on account of the complexity of the subject-matter.
On November 9th, 2020, the EDPB adopted its binding decision and will shortly notify it to the Irish supervisory authority, which, on the other hand, will issue a final decision. It will be addressed to the data controller without undue delay and at the latest by one month after the EDPB has notified its decision. In compliance with the requirements of Art. 65 (6) GDPR, the lead supervisory authority shall inform the EDPB of the date when its final decision is notified respectively to the controller. After that, the EDPB decision will be published on its website.
18. November 2020
A day after the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) issued its recommendations on supplementary measures, on November 12th the European Commission issued a draft on implementing new Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) for data transfers to non-EU countries (third countries). The draft is open for feedback until December 10th, 2020, and includes a 12-month transition period during which companies are to implement the new SCCs. These SCCs are supposed to assist controllers and processors in transferring personal data from an EU-country to a third-country, implementing measures that guarantee GDPR-standards and regarding the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) “Schrems II” ruling.
The Annex includes modular clauses suitable for four different scenarios of data transfer. These scenarios are: (1) Controller-to-controller-transfer; (2) Controller-to-processor-transfer; (3) Processor-processor-transfer; (4) Processor-to-controller-transfer. Newly implemented in these SCCs are the latter two scenarios. Since the clauses in the Annex are modular, they can be mixed and matched into a contract fitting the situation at hand. Furthermore, more than two parties can adhere to the SCC and the modular approach even allows for additional parties to accede later on.
The potential of government access to personal data is distinctly addressed, since this was a main issue following the “Schrems II” ruling. Potential concerns are met by implementing clauses that address how the data importer must react when laws of the third country impinge on his ability to comply with the contract, especially the SCCs, and how he must react in case of government interference. Said measures include notifying the data exporter and the data subject of any government interference, such as legally binding requests of access to personal data, and, if possible, sharing further information on these requests on a regular basis, documenting them and challenging them legally. Termination clauses have been added, in case the data importer cannot comply further, e.g. because of changes in the third country’s law.
Further clauses regard matters such as data security, transparency, accuracy and onwards transfer of personal data, which represent issues that have all been tackled in the older SCCs, but are to be updated now.
17. November 2020
Following the recent judgment C-311/18 (Schrems II) by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) published “Recommendations on measures that supplement transfer tools to ensure compliance with the EU level of protection of personal data” on November 11th. These measures are to be considered when assessing the transfer of personal data to countries outside of the European Economic Area (EEA), or so-called third countries. These recommendations are subject to public consultation until the end of November. Complementing these recommendations, the EDPB published “Recommendations on the European Essential Guarantees for surveillance measures”. Added together both recommendations are guidelines to assess sufficient measures to meet standards of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), even if data is transferred to a country lacking protection comparable to that of the GDPR.
The EDPB highlights a six steps plan to follow when checking whether a data transfer to a third country meets the standards set forth by the GDPR.
The first step is to map all transfers of personal data undertaken, especially transfers into a third country. The transferred data must be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purpose. A major factor to consider is the storage of data in clouds. Furthermore, onwards transfer made by processors should be included. In a second step, the transfer tool used needs to be verified and matched to those listed in Chapter V of the GDPR. The third step is assessing if anything in the law or practice of the third country can impinge on the effectiveness of the safeguards of the transfer tool. The before mentioned Recommendations on European Essential Guarantees are supposed to help to evaluate a third countries laws, regarding the access of data by public authorities for the purpose of surveillance.
If the conclusion that follows the previous steps is that the third countries legislation impinges on the effectiveness of the Article 46 GDPR tool, the fourth step is identifying supplementary measures that are necessary to bring the level of protection of the data transfer up to EU Standards, or at least an equivalent, and adopting these. Recommendations for such measures are listed in Annex 2 of the EDPB Schrems II Recommendations. They may be of contractual, technical, or organizational nature. In Annex 2 the EDPB mentions seven technical cases they found and evaluates them. Five were deemed to be scenarios for which effective measures could be found. These are:
1. Data storage in a third country, that does not require access to the data in the clear.
2. Transfer of pseudonymized data.
3. Encrypted data merely transiting third countries.
4. Transfer of data to by law specially protected recipients.
5. Split or multi-party processing.
Maybe even more relevant are the two scenarios the EDPB found no effective measures for and therefore deemed to not be compliant with GDPR standards.:
6. Transfer of data in the clear (to cloud services or other processors)
7. Remote access (from third countries) to data in the clear, for business purposes, such as, for example, Human Resources.
These two scenarios are frequently used in practice. Still, the EDPB recommends not to execute these transfers in the upcoming future.
Examples of contractual measures are the obligation to implement necessary technical measures, measures regarding transparency of (requested) access by government authorities and measures to be taken against such requests. Accompanying this the European Commission published a draft regarding standard contractual clauses for transferring personal data to non-EU countries, as well as organizational measures such as internal policies and responsibilities regarding government interventions.
The last two steps are undertaking the formal procedural steps to adapt supplementary measures required and re-evaluating the former steps in appropriate intervals.
Even though these recommendations are not (yet) binding, companies should take a further look at the recommendations and check if their data transfers comply with the new situation.
12. November 2020
In recent days, social networks in Poland have teemed with posts containing private addresses and telephone numbers of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, politicians and activists openly supporting the abortion sentence. In conjunction with the publication of the above on Twitter, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (UODO) took immediate steps to protect the personal data and privacy of these persons.
Background to this was the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal repealing the provisions allowing abortion in cases of, for example, serious genetic defects or severe impairment of the human fetus. This provoked resistance from a part of Polish society and led to a street revolution of “liberal” men and women. Unfortunately, the agitation turned into invectives, destruction of property, public disorder and personal arguments. As a result, personal data of people supporting the prohibition of abortion have been shared thousands of times on all social media too. For this reason, numerous protesters appeared at the indicated houses, covered the walls of the surrounding buildings with vulgar inscriptions, and the addressees began to receive packages, e.g. with a set of hangers.
On October 29th, 2020 the President of the UODO responded to the case:
Publishing private addresses and contact details of pro-life activists, politicians and judges by users of the Twitter social network is an action leading to the disclosure of a wide sphere of privacy, and thus posing threats to health and life, such as possible acts of violence and aggression directed against these people and their family members.
The announcement stated that the President of the UODO requested an immediate procedure by the Irish supervisory authority, which is responsible for the processing of personal data via Twitter. Pointing out the enormous scale of threats, he indicated the need to verify the response time to reported irregularities and the possibility of introducing automated solutions to prevent the rapid furtherance of such content by other portal users. He also notified the law enforcement authorities that Twitter users had committed a crime consisting in the processing of personal data without a legal basis. The lawfulness had neither been guaranteed by consent according to Art. 6 (1) lit. a GDPR nor legitimate interests pursuant to Art. 6 (1) lit. f GDPR or any other legal basis. Thus, the processing has to be seen as illegitimate as also stated by the President of the UODO. The law enforcement authorities will be obliged to examine and document both the scope of personal data disclosed in a way that violates the principles of personal data protection and to determine the group of entities responsible for unlawful data processing. The President of the UODO also applied to the Minister of Justice – Public Prosecutor General for placing this case under special supervision due to the escalation of conflict and aggression, which pose a high risk of violating the life interests of both people whose data is published on social media and their family members.
In conclusion, the President of the UODO added:
The intensification of actions of all competent authorities in this matter is necessary due to the unprecedented nature of the violations and the alarming announcements of disclosing the data of more people, as well as the deepening wave of aggression.
Pages: Prev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Next 
