Category: European Data Protection

EDPB published Guideline on Data Breach Examples for Controllers

28. January 2021

On January 18th, 2021, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) published their draft Guidelines 01/2021 on Examples regarding Data Breach Notification.

These Guidelines are supposed to give further support to Controllers alongside the initial Guidelines on Personal Data Breach Notification under the GDPR, adopted by the Article 29 Working Party in February 2018. These new Guidelines are meant to consider different types of situations that the Supervisory Authorities have come across in the last two and a half years since the implementation of the GDPR.

The EDPB’s intention is to assist Controllers in deciding how to handle data breaches, namely by identifying the factors that they must consider when conducting risk assessments to determine whether a breach must be reported to relevant Supervisory Authorities as well as if a notification to the affected Data Subjects is necessary.

The draft Guidelines present examples of common data breach scenarios, including:

• ransomware attacks, where a malicious code encrypts the personal data and the attacker subsequently asks the controller for a ransom in exchange for the decryption code
• data exfiltration attacks, which exploit vulnerabilities in online services offered by the controller and typically aim at copying, exfiltrating and abusing personal data for malicious purposes
• human errors resulting in data breaches that are fairly common and can be both intentional and unintentional
• lost or stolen devices and paper documents
• “mispostal” scenarios, that arise from human error without malicious intent
• social engineering, such as identity theft and email exfiltration

The draft Guidelines further emphasize key elements of data breach management and response that organizations should consider, namely:

• proactively identifying system vulnerabilities in order to prevent data breaches from happening in the first place
• assessing whether a breach is likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of the Data Subject, the timing of this assessment and the importance of Controllers not delaying a notification because of unclear circumstances
• implementing plans, procedures and guidelines indicating how to handle data breaches that have clear reporting lines and persons responsible for the recovery process
• organizing regular trainings for employees to raise awareness on data breach management, and the latest developments in the area
• documenting breaches in each and every case, irrespective of the risk they pose

The Guidelines will be open for public consultation until March 2nd, 2021, during which the EDPB will gather feedback on the draft.

Clubhouse Data Protection issues

Clubhouse is a new social networking app by the US company Alpha Exploration Co. available for iOS devices. Registered users can open rooms for others to talk about various topics. Participation is possible both as a speaker and as a mere listener. These rooms can be available for the public or as closed groups. The moderators speak live in the rooms and the listeners can then join the virtual room. Participants are initially muted and can be unmuted by the moderators to talk. In addition, the moderators can also mute the participants or exclude them from the respective room. As of now, new users need to be invited by other users, the popularity of these invitations started to rise in autumn 2020 when US celebrities started to use the app. With increasing popularity also in the EU, Clubhouse has come under criticism from a data protection perspective.

As mentioned Clubhouse can only be used upon an invitation. To use the option to invite friends, users must share their address book with Clubhouse. In this way, Alpha Exploration can collect personal data from contacts who have not previously consented to the processing of their data and who do not use the app. Not only Alpha Exploration, but also users may be acting unlawfully when they give the app access to their contacts. The user may also be responsible for the data processing associated with the sharing of address books. Therefore, it is not only the responsibility of Alpha Exploration, but also of the user to ensure that consent has been obtained from the contacts whose personal data is being processed. From a data protection perspective, it is advisable not to grant the Clubhouse app access to this data unless the consent of the respective data subjects has been obtained and ideally documented. Currently, this data is transferred to US servers without the consent of the data subjects in the said address books. Furthermore, it is not apparent in what form and for what purposes the collected contact and account information of third parties is processed in the USA.

Under Clubouse’s Terms of Service, and in many cases according to several national laws, users are prohibited from recording or otherwise storing conversations without the consent of all parties involved. Nevertheless, the same Terms of Service include the sentence “By using the service, you consent to having your audio temporarily recorded when you speak in a room.” According to Clubhouse’s Privacy Policy, these recordings are used to punish violations of the Terms of Service, the Community Guidelines and legal regulations. The data is said to be deleted when the room in question is closed without any violations having been reported. Again, consent to data processing should be treated as the general rule. This consent must be so-called informed consent. In view of the fact that the scope and purpose of the storage are not apparent and are vaguely formulated, there are doubts about this. Checking one’s own platform for legal violations is in principle, if not a legal obligation in individual cases, at least a so-called legitimate interest (Art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR) of the platform operator. As long as recordings are limited to this, they are compliant with the GDPR. The platform operator who records the conversations is primarily responsible for this data processing. However, users who use Clubhouse for conversations with third parties may be jointly responsible, even though they do not record themselves. This is unlikely to play a major role in the private sphere, but all the more so if the use is in a business context.

It is suspected that Clubhouse creates shadow profiles in its own network. These are profiles for people who appear in the address books of Clubhouse users but are not themselves registered with Clubhouse. For this reason, Clubhouse considers numbers like “Mobile-Box” to be well-connected potential users. So far, there is no easy way to object to Clubhouse’s creation of shadow profiles that include name, number, and potential contacts.

Clubhouse’s Terms of Use and Privacy Policy do not mention the GDPR. There is also no address for data protection information requests in the EU. However, this is mandatory, as personal data of EU citizens is also processed. In addition, according to Art. 14 GDPR, EU data subjects must be informed about how their data is processed. This information must be provided to data subjects before their personal data is processed. That is, before the data subject is invited via Clubhouse and personal data is thereby stored on Alpha Exploration’s servers. This information does not take place. There must be a simple opt-out option, it is questionable whether one exists. According to the GDPR, companies that process data of European citizens must also designate responsible persons for this in Europe. So far, it is not apparent that Clubhouse even has such data controllers in Europe.

The german “Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband” (“VZBV”), the german federate Consumer Organisation, has issued a written warning (in German) to Alpha Exploration, complaining that Clubhouse is operated without the required imprint and that the terms of use and privacy policy are only available in English, not in German as required. The warning includes a penalty-based cease-and-desist declaration relating to Alpha Exploration’s claim of the right to extensive use of the uploaded contact information. Official responses from European data protection authorities regarding Clubhouse are currently not available. The main data protection authority in this case is the Irish Data Protection Commissioner.

So far, it appears that Clubhouse’s data protection is based solely on the CCPA and not the GDPR. Business use of Clubhouse within the scope of the GDPR should be done with extreme caution, if at all.

CJEU Advocate General’s opinion on GDPR’s One-Stop-Shop mechanism

26. January 2021

On January 13, 2021, the Advocate General (“AG”) of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) published an opinion in the case of Facebook Ireland Limited, Facebook INC, Facebook Belgium BVBA v the Belgian Data Protection Authority “Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit” (“Belgian DPA”), addressing the General Data Protection Regulation’s (“GDPR”) One-Stop-Shop mechanism.

In 2015, the Belgian DPA initiated several legal proceedings against Facebook Group members in local courts. The allegation was that Facebook placed cookies on devices of Belgian users without their consent, thereby collecting data in an excessive manner. Facebook argued that with the GDPR becoming applicable in 2018, the Belgian DPA lost its competence to continue the legal proceedings, as Facebook’s lead supervisory authority under the GDPR is the Irish Data Protection Commission. The Belgian Court of Appeal referred several questions to the CJEU, including whether the GDPR’s One-Stop-Shop regime prevented national DPA’s from initiating proceedings in the national courts when it is not the lead DPA.

The AG responded that, in his opinion, the lead DPA has the general jurisdiction over cross-border data processing, while a national DPA may exceptionally bring proceedings before its own national courts. The national DPA’s right is subject to the One-Stop-Shop regime and cooperation and consistency mechanism of the GDPR. Thus, each national DPA has the competence to initiate proceedings against possible infringements affecting its territory, the significant regulatory role of the lead DPA limits this competence with respect to cross-border data processing.

One of the concerns expressed by the Belgian DPA was the risk of insufficient enforcement if only lead DPA’s may act against organizations that do not comply with the GDPR. In this regard, the GA emphasizes that Art. 61 GDPR specifically provides for appropriate mechanisms to address such concerns. National DPA’s have the possibility to ask the lead DPA for assistance in investigations, and if such assistance is not provided, the national DPA concerned may take action itself.

In certain circumstances, the AG sees the possibility for national DPAs not acting as lead DPA to initiate proceedings before their national court, if

  • the DPA is acting outside of the material scope of the GDPR; e.g., because the processing does not involve personal data;
  • cross-border data processing is carried out by public authorities, in the public interest, or to comply with legal obligations;
  • the processor is not established in the EU;
  • there is an urgent need to act to protect the rights and freedoms of data subjects (Art. 66 GDPR);
  • the lead DPA has decided not to process a case.

With regards to data subjects, the AG notes that data subjects can bring action against any controller or processor before the court of their Member State and may file a complaint with their Member State’s DPA, regardless of which Member State’s DPA is the lead DPA.

The AG’s opinion is not legally binding on the CJEU, although the CJEU will take it into account. A final judgment of the CJEU is expected in the coming months. Thereafter, the Belgian Court of Appeal will have to decide its case in accordance with the CJEU’s judgment. The CJEU’s decision will most likely have a lasting impact on the division of roles between lead DPAs and other national DPAs, as well as on the ability of national DPAs to take enforcement actions into their own hands.

WhatsApp’s privacy policy update halted

22. January 2021

Already at the beginning of December 2020, first indications came up signaling that WhatsApp will change its terms of service and privacy policy. Earlier this year, users received the update notice when launching the app on their device. It stated that the new terms concern additional information on how WhatsApp processes user data and how businesses can use Facebook hosted services to store and manage their WhatsApp chats. The terms should be accepted by February 8th, 2021, to continue using the chat service. Otherwise, the deletion of the account was suggested, because it will not be possible to use WhatsApp without accepting the changes. The notice has caused all sorts of confusion and criticism, because it has mistakenly made many users believe that the agreement allows WhatsApp to share all collected user data with company parent Facebook, which had faced repeated privacy controversies in the past.

Users’ fears in this regard are not entirely unfounded. As a matter of fact, outside the EU, WhatsApp user data has already been flowing to Facebook since 2016 – for advertising purposes, among other things. Though, for the EU and the United Kingdom, other guidelines apply without any data transfer.

The negative coverage and user reactions caused WhatsApp to hastily note that the changes explicitly do not affect EU users. Niamh Sweeney, director of policy at WhatsApp, said via Twitter that it remained the case that WhatsApp did not share European user data with Facebook for the purpose of using this data to improve Facebook’s products or ads.

However, since the topic continues to stir the emotions, WhatsApp felt compelled to provide clarification with a tweet and a FAQ. The statements make it clear once again that the changes are related to optional business features and provide further transparency about how the company collects and uses data. The end-to-end encryption, with which chat content is only visible to the participating users, will not be changed. Moreover, the new update does not expand WhatsApp’s ability to share data with Facebook.

Nevertheless, despite all efforts, WhatsApp has not managed to explain the changes in an understandable way. It has even had to accept huge user churn in recent days. The interest in messenger alternatives has increased enormously. Eventually, the public backlash led to an official announcement that the controversial considered update will be delayed until May 15th, 2021. Due to misinformation and concern, users shall be given more time to review the policy on their own in order to understand WhatsApp’s privacy and security principles.

German online shop receives fine of 10.4 mio. Euro for unlawful video surveillance

13. January 2021

The State Commissioner for Data Protection of Niedersachsen (“LfD Niedersachsen) has imposed a fine of 10.4 mio. Euro on notebooksbilliger.de AG, a German online shop for notebooks.

According to the press release of the LfD Niedersachsen, dated 08.01.2021, notebooksbilliger.de had been video-monitoring its employees for at least two years, including  workplaces, sales rooms, warehouses and common areas, without a legal basis. Customers were also affected by the video surveillance, as some cameras were directed at seats in the sales area of the stationary stores.

Notebooksbilliger.de claimed that the cameras were intended to prevent and solve crimes and offences as well as track the flow of goods in the warehouses. In the opinion of the LfD Niedersachsen, a company must consider milder measures to prevent thefts such as random bag checks of the employees when leaving the premises. Moreover, video surveillance is only considered lawful, if there is reasonable suspicion against specific persons and only for a limited period of time. This was not the case at notebooksbilliger as the authority investigated. Additionally, the recordings of the video surveillance were stored for 60 days in many cases, which was significantly longer than necessary.

In the meantime, notebooksbilliger.de had set up the video surveillance lawfully and had proven that to the LfD Niedersachsen.

The fine is not yet legally binding. The company has appealed the fine and published a statement in this regard on its homepage. Notebooksbilliger.de considers the amount of the fine to be disproportionate to the financial strength of the company and defends itself against the statement that it systematically monitored the performance and behavior of its employees. According to the statement, the video system was at no time designed to monitor the behavior of employees or their performance. Futhermore, despite several invitations by notebooksbilliger.de, no one of the authority had spoken to employees in the company’s warehouses or dispatch centers.

European Commission proposes draft “Digital Service Act” and “Digital Market Act”

21. December 2020

On December 15th, the European Commission published drafts on the “Digital Service Act” (“DSA”) and the “Digital Market Act” (“DMA”), which are intended to restrict large online platforms and stimulate competition.

The DSA is intended to rework the 20-year-old e-Commerce Directive and introduce a paradigm shift in accountability. Under the DSA, platforms would have to prove that they acted in a timely manner in removing or blocking access to illegal content, or that they have no actual knowledge of such content. Violators would face fines of up to 6% of annual revenue. Authorities could order providers to take action against specific illegal content, after which they must provide immediate feedback on what action was taken and when. Providing false, incomplete or misleading information as part of the reporting requirement or failing to conduct an on-site inspection could result in fines of up to 1% of annual revenue. The scope of said illegal content is to include for example, criminal hate comments, discriminatory content, depictions of child sexual abuse, non-consensual sharing of private images, unauthorized use of copyrighted works, and terrorist content. Hosting providers will be required to establish efficient notice and action mechanisms that allow individuals to report and take action against posts they deem illegal. Platforms would not only be required to remove illegal content, but also explain to users why the content was blocked and give them the opportunity to complain.

Any advertising on ad-supported platforms would be required to be clearly identifiable as advertising and clearly state who sponsored it. Exceptions are to apply to smaller journalistic portals and bloggers, while even stricter rules would apply to large platforms. For example, platforms with more than 45 million active users in the EU could be forced to grant comprehensive access to stored data, provided that trade secrets are not affected, and to set up archives that make it possible to identify disinformation and illegal advertising.

Social network operators would have to conduct annual risk assessments and review how they deal with systemic threats, such as the spread of illegal content. They would also be required to provide clear, easy-to-understand and detailed reports at least once a year on the content moderation they have carried out during that period.

Newly appointed “Digital Service Coordinators” in each EU-Member-State are supposed to enforce the regulation, for example by ordering platforms to share data with researchers who shall investigate the platforms relevant activities, while a new European committee is to ensure that the DSA is applied uniformly across the EU. On demand of the Digital Service Coordinators platforms would have to provide researchers with key data, so they can investigate the platforms relevant activities.

The DMA includes a list of competition requirements for large platforms, so called “gatekeepers”, that have a monopoly-like status. The regulations aim to strengthen smaller competitors and prevent the large gatekeepers from using their dominance to impose practices perceived as unfair. They would neither be allowed to exclusively pre-install their own applications, nor to force other operating system developers or hardware manufacturers to have programs pre-installed exclusively by the gatekeeper’s company. In addition, preventing users from uninstalling included applications would be prohibited. Other common measures of self-preference would also be prohibited. For example, gatekeepers would no longer be allowed to use data generated by their services for their own commercial activities without also making the information available to other commercial users. If a provider wanted to merge data generated by different portals, he would have to obtain explicit consent from users to do so.

The publication of the DSA and the DMA is the next step in the European Commission’s 2020 European strategy for data, following the proposal of the Data Governance Act in November. Like the Data Governance Act, the DSA and DMA aim to push back the dominance of tech giants, particularly those from the U.S. and China, while promoting competition.

Belgian DPA planning to suspend websites that infringe GDPR

8. December 2020

The Belgian Data Protection Authority (DPA) signed a Cooperation Agreement on November 26, 2020, with DNS Belgium, the organization behind the management of the “.be” country-code domain name. The background is to allow DNS Belgium to suspend “.be” websites that are infringing the GDPR. The Agreement builds up a two-tier cooperation system, which aims at identifying infringements and suspending the websites if no action is taken.

The first step is a cooperative investigation, for which DNS Belgium has to support the Belgian DPA by providing all information necessary for the investigation.

The second step is the “Notice and Action” procedure, during which, if the Belgian DPA’s Investigation Service considers a data processing activity conducted via a website with a “.be” domain name to infringe one of the data protection principles under the GDPR, and the responsible data controller or data processor does not comply with the DPA’s order to suspend, limit, freeze or end the data processing activity, the Investigation Service is authorized to send a “Notice and Action” notification to DNS Belgium. Once DNS Belgium receives the “Notice and Action” notification, they will proceed to inform the website owner about the infringement and re-direct the relevant domain name to a warning page of the Belgian DPA.

The website owner can take remedial measures within 14 days to remedy the infringement, upon which he can indicate it to the Belgian DPA. If the Belgian DPA does not contest the measures taken, the relevant domain name will be restored. However, if the infringement is not remediated during the 14-day period, the website will continuously to be re-directed to the Belgian DPA’s warning page for a period of six months. After this time the website will be cancelled and placed in quarantine for 40 days before becoming available for registration once again.

Due to the heavy penalty in cases of a controller not taking any action to remedy the infringement, this action by the Belgian DPA is only possible in cases of infringements that cause very serious harm and are committed by natural or legal persons who deliberately infringe the law, or continue a data processing activity despite a prior order by the Investigation Service of the Belgian DPA to suspend, limit, freeze or end the processing activity.

It is to note that the Inspector General of the Belgian DPA can provide extra time to a website owner to comply with the relevant data protection requirements at the Inspector General’s discretion. However, this will depend on a case by case basis and on the cooperation of the website owner.

Admonition for revealing a list of people quarantined in Poland

27. November 2020

The President of the Personal Data Protection Office in Poland (UODO) imposed an admonition on a company dealing with waste management liable for a data breach and ordered to notify the concerned data subjects. The admonition is based on a violation of personal data pertaining to data subjects under medical quarantine. The city name, street name, building/flat number and the fact of remaining under quarantine of the affected data subjects have been provided by the company to unauthorized recipients. The various recipients were required to verify whether, in a given period, waste was to be collected from places determined in the above-mentioned list.

The incident already happened in April 2020. Back then, a list of data subjects was made public, containing information on who had been quarantined by the administrative decision of the District Sanitary-Epidemiological Station (PPIS) in Gniezno as well as information on quarantined data subjects in connection with crossing the country border and on data subjects undergoing home isolation due to a confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. After becoming aware of the revelation, the Director of PPIS notified the relevant authorities – the District Prosecutor’s Office and the President of UODO – about the incident.

PPIS informed them that it had carried out explanatory activities showing that the source of disclosure of these data was not PPIS. These data were provided to the District Police Headquarters, the Head of the Polish Post Office, Social Welfare Centres and the Headquarters of the State Fire Service. Considering the fact that these data had been processed by various parties involved, it was necessary to establish in which of them the breach may have occurred.

UODO took steps to clarify the situation. In the course of the proceedings, it requested information from a company dealing with waste management being one of the recipients of the personal data. The company, acting as the data controller, had to explain whether, when establishing the procedures related to the processing of personal data, it had carried out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data according to Art. 35 GDPR. The assessment persists in an analysis of the distribution method in electronic and paper form in terms of risks related to the loss of confidentiality. Furthermore, the data controller had to inform UODO about the result of this analysis.

The data controller stated that it had conducted an analysis considering the circumstances related to non-compliance with the procedures in force by data processors and circumstances related to theft or removal of data. Moreover, the data controller expressed the view that the list, received from the District Police Headquarters, only included administrative (police) addresses and did not contain names, surnames and other data allowing the identification of a natural person. Thus, the GDPR would not apply, because the data has to be seen as anonymized. However, from the list also emerged the fact that residents of these buildings/flats were placed in quarantine, which made it possible to identify them. It came out that the confidentiality of the processed data had been violated in the course of the performance of employee duties of the data processor, who had left the printed list on the desk without proper supervision. During this time, another employee had recorded the list in the form of a photo and had shared it with another person.

Following the review of the entirety of the collected material in this case, UODO considered that the information regarding the city name, street name, building/flat number and placing a data subject in medical quarantine, constitute personal data within the meaning of Art. 4 (1) GDPR, while the last comprises a special category of personal data concerning health according to Art. 9 (1) GDPR. Based on the above, it is possible to identify the data subjects, and therefore the data controller is bound to the obligations arising from the GDPR.

In the opinion of UODO, the protective measures indicated in the risk analysis are general formulations, which do not refer to specific activities undertaken by authorized employees. The measures are insufficient and inadequate to the risks of processing special categories of data. In addition, the data controller should have considered factors, such as recklessness and carelessness of employees and a lack of due diligence.

According to Art. 33 (1) GDPR, the data controller shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of the data breach, notify it to the competent supervisory authority. Moreover, in a situation of high risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects, resulting from the data breach (which undoubtedly arose from the disclosure), the data controller is obliged to inform the data subject without undue delay in accordance with Art. 34 (1) GDPR. Despite this, the company did not report the infringement, neither to the President of UODO nor to the concerned data subjects.

EU Commission proposes “Data Governance Act”

The European Commission (“EC”) aims for an ecosystem of cheap, versatile, and secure EU-internal data transfers, so data transfers into non-EU-regions are less needed. For this goal, the EC proposed the “Data Governance Act” on November 25th, as a part of its “2020 European strategy for data“.  These strategies are intended in order to open up new ways of sharing data that is collected by companies and the public sector, or freely shared by individuals, while increasing public trust in data sharing by implementing several measures, such as establishing “data sharing intermediaries”. Combined with the Gaia-X project and several measures to follow, the Data Governance Act sets the basis to create a domestic data market that offers more efficiency of data transfers to the businesses, while also ensuring that GDPR standards are preserved. Key industries in the focus of this agenda are the agricultural, environmental, energy, finance, healthcare and mobility sectors as well as public administration.

During her speech presenting the Data Governance Act, Margarethe Vestager, Executive Vice President of the European Commission for A Europe Fit for the Digital Age, said that there are huge amounts of data produced every day, but not put to any productive use. As examples she names road traffic data from GPS, healthcare data that enables better and faster diagnosis, or data tracking heat usage from house sensors. The amount of data produced is only going to increase exponentially in the years to come. Vestager sees a lot of potential in this unused data and states the industry has an interest in using this data, however it lacks the tools to harness it.

EU based neutral data sharing intermediaries, who serve as safe data sharing organizers, are a key factor in this project. Their role is supposed to boost the willingness of sharing personal data whilst preserving the initial owner’s control. Therefore, intermediaries are not allowed to use the data for themselves, but function as neutral third-parties, transferring data between the data holder and the data user. Furthermore, intermediaries are to organize and combine different data in a neutral way, so no company secrets can be abused and the data is only used for the agreed purpose. Before they start operating, intermediates are required to notify the competent authority of their intention to provide data-sharing services.

New laws are going to ensure that sensitive and confidential data – such as intellectual property rights – can be shared and reused, while a legitimate level of protection is maintained. The same applies to data shared by individuals voluntarily. Individuals will be able to share personal data voluntarily in so-called “personal data spaces”. Once businesses will get access to these, they benefit from large amounts of data for low costs, no effort and on short notice. Vestager introduces the example of an individual suffering from a rare illness, who could provide data of his medical tests into such a personal data space, so businesses can use this data to work on treatments. Further examples are improvements in the management of climate change and the development of more precise farming tools.

To ensure the trust of potential participants, each EU-member-state is supposed to implement new competent authorities that are tasked with implementing and enforcing the Data Governance Act. A new EU-institution, the “European Data Innovation Board”, will be implemented and tasked with informing the EC about new data innovations and working out guidelines on how to implement these innovations into practice.

A more fluent exchange between different kinds of technical expertise is the hoped-for outcome of these changes, as a means to diminish the influence of big tech companies from the U.S. and China.

The Data Governance Act now needs to go through the regular legislative process. A timetable for when it is supposed to come into effect has not yet been set.

EDPB extends consultation period for suplementary measures drafts in 42nd Plenary Session

26. November 2020

On November 19th, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) met for its 42nd plenary session. During the session, the EDPB presented two new Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) drafts, which have been developed after the Schrems II decision to give more legal certainty to data transfers, as well as extended the public consultation period on transfer mechanisms until the 21st of December 2020.

The drafts presented by the EDPB include one set of SCCs for contracts between controllers and processors, and another one for data transfers outside the EU.

The first are completely new, and have been developed by the Commission in accordance with Art. 28 (7) GDPR and Art. 29 (7) of Regulation 2018/1725. This set of SCCs is intended for EU-wide application, and the Commission drafted them with the aim to ensure full harmonisation and legal certainty across the EU for contracts between controllers and processors.

The second set of drafts is a new take on the SCCs as transfer mechanisms according to Art. 46 (2) (c) GDPR. These SCCs will replace the existing SCCs for international transfers that were adopted on the basis of Directive 95/46 and needed to be updated to bring them in line with GDPR requirements, as well as with the CJEU’s ‘Schrems II’ ruling, and to better reflect the widespread use of new and more complex processing operations often involving multiple data importers and exporters.

The Commission requested a joint opinion from the EDPB and the EDPS on the implementation on both sets of SCCs.

During the plenary, the Members of the Board also decided to extend the deadline for the public consultation on the recommendations on measures that supplement transfer tools to ensure compliance with EU level of protection of personal data from, originally, 30th November 2020 until 21st December 2020.

The EDPB further adopted a statement on the future ePrivacy Regulation and the future role of supervisory authorities and the EDPB in this context during the plenary. The EDPB underlines that many of the provisions of the future ePrivacy Regulation relate to the processing of personal data and that many provisions of the GDPR and the ePrivacy Regulation are closely intertwined. The most efficient way to have consistent interpretation and enforcement of both sets of rules would therefore be fulfilled if the enforcement of those parts of the ePrivacy Regulation and the GDPR would be entrusted to the same authority. The EDPB further underlined the necessity to adopt the new Regulation as soon as possible.

Pages: Prev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ... 15 16 17 Next
1 2 3 4 5 6 17